In a ruling that stands to benefit project proponents, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Jones v. National Marine Fisheries Service, Case No. 11-35954 (9th Cir., Dec. 20, 2013), found that the Army Corps of Engineers was not required to consider the cumulative future impacts of a mining project based on the mining company’s general statements about wanting to widen the scope of its mining activities in the future. Judge Milan Smith authored the unanimous decision, wherein the panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the Army Corps of Engineers in an action challenging the Corps’ issuance of a Section 404 permit under the Clean Water Act for a project to mine mineral sands near Coos Bay, Oregon.
The plaintiffs argued that the mining company’s general statements that it intended to expand its mining operations along a 50-mile stretch of the Oregon coast, as well as the Corps’ consideration of three alternative sites analyzed in the Environmental Assessment as possible future projects, required the Corps to analyze the cumulative impacts of the permitted mining project under NEPA’s implementing regulations.
The Court disagreed, concluding that the mining company’s stated desires, which included a statement that it intended to mine along the Oregon coast “from Cape Arago to Port Orford,” did not give specific information as to the number, scope or location of any future projects.
The Court also found that the three alternative sites analyzed in the EA faced significant hurdles to development. Relying on its prior decisions in Lands Council v. Powell, 395 F.3d 1019 (9th Cir. 2005), Environmental Protection Information Center v. United States Forest Service, 451 F.3d 1005 (9th Cir. 2006), and Northern Plains Resource Council, Inc. v. Surface Transportation Board, 668 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2011), the Court held that the mining company’s intended future activities were speculative and not reasonably foreseeable, and therefore, cumulative impact analysis under NEPA was not required.
The Court also found that the Corps adequately examined the risks associated with potential hexavalent chromium generation from the proposed mining project and conducted an adequate “alternatives analysis” prior to issuing the Section 404 permit.
-- Samir Abdelnour
For more information, please contact Samir Abdelnour at sja@bcltlaw.com, or (415) 228-5443.
Tuesday, January 14, 2014
Thursday, January 9, 2014
EPA Calls for New “Completion Strategies” at Contaminated Groundwater Sites
In October 2013, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency issued its draft “Groundwater Remedy Completion Strategy – Moving Forward with Completion in Mind,” which would establish a recommended strategy for an adaptive management-style approach to managing contaminated groundwater sites. The strategy calls for rigorous data assessment of the performance of groundwater cleanup actions to achieve remedial action objectives (RAOs), and clarifies that RAOs and cleanup goals should be reevaluated if impediments prevent achieving those objectives.
Buried in this regulatory jargon is one significant impact of the Completion Strategy – this document confirms EPA’s recognition that some groundwater sites present problems so intractable that RAOs and cleanup levels are not likely to be achieved in any reasonable timeframe.
Although EPA clarifies that the Completion Strategy relies on–but does not alter–existing law and guidance, the document recommends that a remedy completion strategy be completed for all sites with groundwater remedies. A completion strategy is “a recommended site-specific course of action(s) and decision making process(es) to achieve groundwater RAOs and associated cleanup levels using an updated conceptual site model, performance metrics and data derived from site-specific remedy evaluations.”
The Completion Strategy lays out an adaptive management-style approach to evaluating remedy performance that proceeds through the following steps:
The comment period closed on December 20, 2013, and a final draft is expected in early 2014. The draft Completion Strategy, supporting fact sheet, letter to “interested parties,” and a frequently asked questions document are all available here.
--Dave Metres
For additional information, Dave Metres can be reached at dmm@bcltlaw.com or (415) 228-5488.
Buried in this regulatory jargon is one significant impact of the Completion Strategy – this document confirms EPA’s recognition that some groundwater sites present problems so intractable that RAOs and cleanup levels are not likely to be achieved in any reasonable timeframe.
Although EPA clarifies that the Completion Strategy relies on–but does not alter–existing law and guidance, the document recommends that a remedy completion strategy be completed for all sites with groundwater remedies. A completion strategy is “a recommended site-specific course of action(s) and decision making process(es) to achieve groundwater RAOs and associated cleanup levels using an updated conceptual site model, performance metrics and data derived from site-specific remedy evaluations.”
The Completion Strategy lays out an adaptive management-style approach to evaluating remedy performance that proceeds through the following steps:
- Understand site conditions, including timeframe estimated to achieve cleanup;
- Design site-specific remedy evaluations, including endogenous and exogenous factors affecting remedy achievement;
- Develop performance metrics–such as remedy operation metrics, progress metrics, and attainment metrics–and collect monitoring data;
- Conduct remedy evaluations, including whether and when the remedy will achieve RAOs and cleanup levels; and
- Make management decisions that feed these data points back into remedy design, potentially through an Explanation of Significant Differences (ESD) or a Record of Decision (ROD) Amendment.
The comment period closed on December 20, 2013, and a final draft is expected in early 2014. The draft Completion Strategy, supporting fact sheet, letter to “interested parties,” and a frequently asked questions document are all available here.
--Dave Metres
For additional information, Dave Metres can be reached at dmm@bcltlaw.com or (415) 228-5488.
Wednesday, November 13, 2013
Agencies Send OMB Draft Regulations Defining Clean Water Act Jurisdiction
After years of starts and stops, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers have drafted a proposed regulation that will significantly affect which waters are subject to regulation under the Clean Water Act.
Following 2001 and 2006 U.S. Supreme Court rulings addressing which “waters of the United States” are subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction, EPA, the Corps, federal courts across the country, and the regulated community have all struggled to interpret the Supreme Court’s rulings. Those rulings, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), offered no clear guidance. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s lone concurrence in the Rapanos plurality opinion stands as the guiding principle in determining what defines a “water of the United States.”
Justice Kennedy’s view that waters with a “significant nexus” to more traditionally jurisdictional waters may be regulated provides the basis of EPA’s and the Corps’ proposed regulation. Among other things, the regulation would, for the first time, define “significant nexus.” That term would be defined as “a more than speculative or insubstantial effect that a water, including wetlands, either alone or in combination with other similarly situated waters in the region . . . has on the chemical, physical or biological integrity” of more traditionally jurisdictional waters as defined in the regulation. The proposal would also define “tributary” such that any defined tributary would have the significant nexus necessary to bring it within the scope of the Clean Water Act.
The agencies have submitted a draft of the proposed regulation to the Office of Management Budget. When published in the Federal Register, it will undoubtedly generate thousands of comments. It is far too early to speculate as to whether the final regulation will look like the proposed regulation, when a final regulation may be issued, and, in the face of almost certain litigation once the rule is final, when the regulations may actually be implemented.
-- Josh Bloom
For more information, please contact Josh Bloom at (415) 228-5406 or jab@bcltlaw.com.
Following 2001 and 2006 U.S. Supreme Court rulings addressing which “waters of the United States” are subject to Clean Water Act jurisdiction, EPA, the Corps, federal courts across the country, and the regulated community have all struggled to interpret the Supreme Court’s rulings. Those rulings, Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), and Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006), offered no clear guidance. Indeed, Justice Kennedy’s lone concurrence in the Rapanos plurality opinion stands as the guiding principle in determining what defines a “water of the United States.”
Justice Kennedy’s view that waters with a “significant nexus” to more traditionally jurisdictional waters may be regulated provides the basis of EPA’s and the Corps’ proposed regulation. Among other things, the regulation would, for the first time, define “significant nexus.” That term would be defined as “a more than speculative or insubstantial effect that a water, including wetlands, either alone or in combination with other similarly situated waters in the region . . . has on the chemical, physical or biological integrity” of more traditionally jurisdictional waters as defined in the regulation. The proposal would also define “tributary” such that any defined tributary would have the significant nexus necessary to bring it within the scope of the Clean Water Act.
The agencies have submitted a draft of the proposed regulation to the Office of Management Budget. When published in the Federal Register, it will undoubtedly generate thousands of comments. It is far too early to speculate as to whether the final regulation will look like the proposed regulation, when a final regulation may be issued, and, in the face of almost certain litigation once the rule is final, when the regulations may actually be implemented.
-- Josh Bloom
For more information, please contact Josh Bloom at (415) 228-5406 or jab@bcltlaw.com.
Tuesday, October 15, 2013
Supreme Court Agrees to Review EPA’s Greenhouse Gas Rules for Stationary Sources
Earlier today, the Supreme Court announced that it would
review the EPA’s decision to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from stationary
sources such as power plants and industrial facilities.
The Court granted certiorari on a narrow issue that follows from its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007):
The Court granted certiorari on a narrow issue that follows from its decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007):
“Whether EPA permissibly determined
that its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles
triggered permitting requirements under the Clean Air Act for stationary
sources that emit greenhouse gases.”
In Massachusetts v.
EPA, the Court held that EPA had authority to regulate greenhouse gases as
“air pollutants” under Section 202(a)(1) of the Clean Air Act (42
U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)), a provision that applies to new motor vehicles. On remand following the Supreme Court’s
ruling, EPA made the “endangerment finding” needed to initiate regulation of
greenhouse gases in motor vehicles—i.e.,
that greenhouse gases may “cause, or contribute to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
(Id.) In separate regulatory proceedings, EPA
concluded that the its decision to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new
motor vehicles compelled the conclusion that it was also required to regulate
greenhouse gases from stationary sources under the Clean Air Act’s Prevention
of Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) program.
The Court’s order
consolidates six petitions for review (12-1146, 12-1248, 12-1254, 12-1268,
12-1269, and 12-1272), but granted review on only the narrow question of
whether EPA correctly concluded that its endangerment finding under the Clean
Air Act’s new motor vehicle provision requires the Agency to also regulate
greenhouse gas emissions from stationary sources.
--Chris Jensen
For more information, contact Chris Jensen at
(415) 228-5411, or cdj@bcltlaw.com.
Monday, October 7, 2013
Debtors Beware: Resolving Environmental Liabilities in a Judicially Approved Bankruptcy Settlement Triggers the Statute of Limitations on CERCLA Contribution Claims
When an entity that has filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code resolves its environmental liability to a state or the United States via a settlement agreement, there are several steps involved in the process. Typically, the debtor and the state or United States will first execute a written settlement agreement. The parties will then submit that agreement for approval by the bankruptcy court. If the bankruptcy court approves the settlement, it will issue a written approval. The settlement is then incorporated into the plan of reorganization. If the bankruptcy court approves the plan of reorganization, it will issue a written confirmation.
Given the numerous steps involved in the process, the debtor entity may be uncertain as to which of the steps starts the clock on its statute of limitations for contribution claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) subsection 113(f). The relevant statute of limitations provision is CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B), which provides: “No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced more than 3 years after . . . entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B). Recent decisions issued in federal district courts in Washington, Montana, Utah, New York, and Colorado confirm that the statute of limitations under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B) is triggered on the date that the bankruptcy court approves a settlement agreement between the debtor and the government, not on the date that the bankruptcy court approves a plan of reorganization or the date a plan of reorganization becomes effective.
In ASARCO LLC v. HECLA Mining Company, 2012 WL 5929962 (E.D. Wash., November 27, 2012), defendant Callahan Mining Corporation (“Callahan”) filed a motion to dismiss a CERCLA contribution claim, arguing, in relevant part, that the bankruptcy court’s approval of Asarco LLC’s (“Asarco”) settlement with the State of Washington triggered the statute of limitations under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B). Asarco argued that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until either the bankruptcy court approved the confirmed plan of reorganization or the plan of reorganization became effective. Asarco further argued that even if its settlement with Washington triggered the statute of limitations, its complaint was still timely when the rules for computing time under Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied. The district court denied Callahan’s motion to dismiss, stating that Rule 6(a) was relevant in determining the statute of limitations and thus impliedly holding that the triggering event for Asarco’s contribution claim was the judicial approval of the bankruptcy settlement, not the approval of the confirmed plan of reorganization or the effective date of the plan of reorganization. 2012 WL 5929962 at *5.
In ASARCO LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2012 WL 5995662 (D. Mont. Nov. 30, 2012), defendant American Chemet Corporation (“American”) similarly moved to dismiss a CERCLA contribution claim on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that Asarco resolved its liabilities in settlement agreements with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that were judicially approved in 1990 and 1998. In response, Asarco argued that the statute did not begin to run until either the bankruptcy court approved the confirmed plan of reorganization or the plan of reorganization became effective. The district court denied American’s motion to dismiss, but held that, “The plain language of § 9613(g)(3)(B) contradicts [Asarco’s] contention that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until its Reorganization Plan was either approved by the Bankruptcy Court or became effective.” 2012 WL 5995662 at *2. The court held that the statute of limitations runs from the date of the entry of the settlement agreement, not the date that each provision of that settlement takes effect. Id.
In a third case, ASARCO LLC v. Xstrata PLC, 2013 WL 2949046 (D. Utah, June 14, 2013), defendant Xstrata PLC (“Xstrata”) filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Asarco’s CERCLA contribution complaint was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B) because more than three years had passed since the bankruptcy court approved a private party settlement relating to Asarco’s environmental liabilities. Asarco argued the entry of the order approving the private party bankruptcy settlement did not trigger the statute of limitations; it was triggered when Asarco’s plan of reorganization became effective because that is when the amount of liability under the private agreement was fixed. The court rejected both parties’ arguments and denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B), the triggering date for the statute of limitations was the bankruptcy court’s June 5, 2009 approval of a settlement entered between Asarco and EPA, which gave rise to Asarco’s right to contribution under CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B). 2013 WL 2949046 at *3-5. Because Asarco filed its complaint on June 5, 2012, its complaint was timely. Id. at *5.
In a fourth case, Asarco LLC v. Goodwin, U.S. District Court, S.D.N.Y., Case No. 1:12-cv-03749, Docket Nos. 30-32, defendant trustees filed a motion to dismiss Asarco’s CERCLA contribution claim, arguing that the bankruptcy court’s approval of Asarco’s settlement of its environmental liabilities with the State of Washington more than three years prior to the date of Asarco’s original complaint triggered the statute of limitations under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B) and barred Asarco’s claim. Asarco argued that its claims were timely because the statue of limitations was not triggered until the amount of its liability was fixed, which occurred when its plan of reorganization was confirmed. Case No. 1:12-cv-03749, Docket No. 35. The court rejected Asarco’s argument and granted the defendant trustees’ motion to dismiss on the basis that Asarco’s claims were time-barred, among other reasons. Case No. 1:12-cv-03749, Docket No. 41 and transcript of hearing on motion to dismiss.
Finally, in ASARCO LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 2013 WL 5291422 (D. Colo., September 19, 2013), the court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granted defendants’ Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”) and Pepsi-Cola’s (“Pepsi”) motions to dismiss. Both Union Pacific and Pepsi argued that Asarco’s CERCLA contribution complaint was time barred under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B) because more than three years had elapsed since the date that the bankruptcy court approved a settlement between Asarco and EPA. Asarco argued that the statute did not begin to run until the bankruptcy court approved the confirmed plan of reorganization and the plan of reorganization became effective. The court held that “the date a settling party makes payment is irrelevant” and that the statute of limitations was triggered by the bankruptcy court’s entry of the settlement between Asarco and EPA. 2013 WL 5291422 at *5. The court cited the Atlantic Richfield Co. and Xstrata opinions (supra) as persuasive authority.
Based on these decisions, debtors who resolve their environmental liability to a state or the United States via settlement should be prepared to file any claims for contribution under CERCLA subsection 113(f) within three years of the date that the bankruptcy court issues its approval of the settlement agreement.
--Estie Kus
For more information, contact Estie Kus at (415) 228-5463 or emk@bcltlaw.com.
Given the numerous steps involved in the process, the debtor entity may be uncertain as to which of the steps starts the clock on its statute of limitations for contribution claims under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”) subsection 113(f). The relevant statute of limitations provision is CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B), which provides: “No action for contribution for any response costs or damages may be commenced more than 3 years after . . . entry of a judicially approved settlement with respect to such costs or damages.” 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3)(B). Recent decisions issued in federal district courts in Washington, Montana, Utah, New York, and Colorado confirm that the statute of limitations under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B) is triggered on the date that the bankruptcy court approves a settlement agreement between the debtor and the government, not on the date that the bankruptcy court approves a plan of reorganization or the date a plan of reorganization becomes effective.
In ASARCO LLC v. HECLA Mining Company, 2012 WL 5929962 (E.D. Wash., November 27, 2012), defendant Callahan Mining Corporation (“Callahan”) filed a motion to dismiss a CERCLA contribution claim, arguing, in relevant part, that the bankruptcy court’s approval of Asarco LLC’s (“Asarco”) settlement with the State of Washington triggered the statute of limitations under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B). Asarco argued that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until either the bankruptcy court approved the confirmed plan of reorganization or the plan of reorganization became effective. Asarco further argued that even if its settlement with Washington triggered the statute of limitations, its complaint was still timely when the rules for computing time under Rule 6(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied. The district court denied Callahan’s motion to dismiss, stating that Rule 6(a) was relevant in determining the statute of limitations and thus impliedly holding that the triggering event for Asarco’s contribution claim was the judicial approval of the bankruptcy settlement, not the approval of the confirmed plan of reorganization or the effective date of the plan of reorganization. 2012 WL 5929962 at *5.
In ASARCO LLC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2012 WL 5995662 (D. Mont. Nov. 30, 2012), defendant American Chemet Corporation (“American”) similarly moved to dismiss a CERCLA contribution claim on statute of limitations grounds, arguing that Asarco resolved its liabilities in settlement agreements with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) that were judicially approved in 1990 and 1998. In response, Asarco argued that the statute did not begin to run until either the bankruptcy court approved the confirmed plan of reorganization or the plan of reorganization became effective. The district court denied American’s motion to dismiss, but held that, “The plain language of § 9613(g)(3)(B) contradicts [Asarco’s] contention that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until its Reorganization Plan was either approved by the Bankruptcy Court or became effective.” 2012 WL 5995662 at *2. The court held that the statute of limitations runs from the date of the entry of the settlement agreement, not the date that each provision of that settlement takes effect. Id.
In a third case, ASARCO LLC v. Xstrata PLC, 2013 WL 2949046 (D. Utah, June 14, 2013), defendant Xstrata PLC (“Xstrata”) filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Asarco’s CERCLA contribution complaint was filed outside the applicable statute of limitations under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B) because more than three years had passed since the bankruptcy court approved a private party settlement relating to Asarco’s environmental liabilities. Asarco argued the entry of the order approving the private party bankruptcy settlement did not trigger the statute of limitations; it was triggered when Asarco’s plan of reorganization became effective because that is when the amount of liability under the private agreement was fixed. The court rejected both parties’ arguments and denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning that under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B), the triggering date for the statute of limitations was the bankruptcy court’s June 5, 2009 approval of a settlement entered between Asarco and EPA, which gave rise to Asarco’s right to contribution under CERCLA section 113(f)(3)(B). 2013 WL 2949046 at *3-5. Because Asarco filed its complaint on June 5, 2012, its complaint was timely. Id. at *5.
In a fourth case, Asarco LLC v. Goodwin, U.S. District Court, S.D.N.Y., Case No. 1:12-cv-03749, Docket Nos. 30-32, defendant trustees filed a motion to dismiss Asarco’s CERCLA contribution claim, arguing that the bankruptcy court’s approval of Asarco’s settlement of its environmental liabilities with the State of Washington more than three years prior to the date of Asarco’s original complaint triggered the statute of limitations under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B) and barred Asarco’s claim. Asarco argued that its claims were timely because the statue of limitations was not triggered until the amount of its liability was fixed, which occurred when its plan of reorganization was confirmed. Case No. 1:12-cv-03749, Docket No. 35. The court rejected Asarco’s argument and granted the defendant trustees’ motion to dismiss on the basis that Asarco’s claims were time-barred, among other reasons. Case No. 1:12-cv-03749, Docket No. 41 and transcript of hearing on motion to dismiss.
Finally, in ASARCO LLC v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 2013 WL 5291422 (D. Colo., September 19, 2013), the court adopted the recommendation of the magistrate judge and granted defendants’ Union Pacific Railroad Company (“Union Pacific”) and Pepsi-Cola’s (“Pepsi”) motions to dismiss. Both Union Pacific and Pepsi argued that Asarco’s CERCLA contribution complaint was time barred under CERCLA section 113(g)(3)(B) because more than three years had elapsed since the date that the bankruptcy court approved a settlement between Asarco and EPA. Asarco argued that the statute did not begin to run until the bankruptcy court approved the confirmed plan of reorganization and the plan of reorganization became effective. The court held that “the date a settling party makes payment is irrelevant” and that the statute of limitations was triggered by the bankruptcy court’s entry of the settlement between Asarco and EPA. 2013 WL 5291422 at *5. The court cited the Atlantic Richfield Co. and Xstrata opinions (supra) as persuasive authority.
Based on these decisions, debtors who resolve their environmental liability to a state or the United States via settlement should be prepared to file any claims for contribution under CERCLA subsection 113(f) within three years of the date that the bankruptcy court issues its approval of the settlement agreement.
--Estie Kus
For more information, contact Estie Kus at (415) 228-5463 or emk@bcltlaw.com.
Thursday, October 3, 2013
CARB Releases Draft Update of Climate Change Scoping Plan
The California Air Resources Board (CARB) has released a discussion draft of the First Update of California’s Climate Change Scoping Plan for public review and comment.
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) requires CARB to update the Scoping Plan every five years. The updated Scoping Plan discusses progress toward meeting AB 32’s short-term target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, concluding that California is on track to meet that goal, and summarizes policy alternatives that would allow the State to achieve the long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2050. (See Executive Order S-3-05.)
The Scoping Plan also states CARB’s intention to adopt an interim target for 2030 emissions, citing the United States’ pledge in the Copenhagen Accord to reduce emissions to 42% percent below 2005 levels (33% of 1990 levels) by 2030, and noting that “this level of reduction is achievable in California.”
With respect to the Cap and Trade Program that covers emissions from electric utilities, transportation fuels, and certain industrial sectors, the Scoping Plan notes that “CARB will develop post-2020 emissions caps to reflect the establishment of a 2030 midterm target,” and leaves open the possibility that the Cap and Trade Program “may need to include broader emissions scope” that would extend the Program to new industries.
The Scoping Plan neither specifies the level of the midterm emissions reductions target nor does it identify the additional industrial sectors that may be covered under an expanded Cap and Trade Program. These details are left for future legislation and regulatory activity and are sure to the subject of intense debate and lobbying efforts in Sacramento.
--Chris Jensen
For more information, contact Chris Jensen at (415) 228-5411, cdj@bcltlaw.com.
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (AB 32) requires CARB to update the Scoping Plan every five years. The updated Scoping Plan discusses progress toward meeting AB 32’s short-term target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020, concluding that California is on track to meet that goal, and summarizes policy alternatives that would allow the State to achieve the long-term goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions to 80% of 1990 levels by 2050. (See Executive Order S-3-05.)
The Scoping Plan also states CARB’s intention to adopt an interim target for 2030 emissions, citing the United States’ pledge in the Copenhagen Accord to reduce emissions to 42% percent below 2005 levels (33% of 1990 levels) by 2030, and noting that “this level of reduction is achievable in California.”
With respect to the Cap and Trade Program that covers emissions from electric utilities, transportation fuels, and certain industrial sectors, the Scoping Plan notes that “CARB will develop post-2020 emissions caps to reflect the establishment of a 2030 midterm target,” and leaves open the possibility that the Cap and Trade Program “may need to include broader emissions scope” that would extend the Program to new industries.
The Scoping Plan neither specifies the level of the midterm emissions reductions target nor does it identify the additional industrial sectors that may be covered under an expanded Cap and Trade Program. These details are left for future legislation and regulatory activity and are sure to the subject of intense debate and lobbying efforts in Sacramento.
--Chris Jensen
For more information, contact Chris Jensen at (415) 228-5411, cdj@bcltlaw.com.
Wednesday, October 2, 2013
Central Valley Water Board Adopts New Groundwater Monitoring Rules for Agricultural Lands
On September 26, 2013, the Central Valley Regional Water Control Board adopted new rules authorizing the imposition of Waste Discharge Requirements (WDRs) on agricultural lands in Fresno, Tulare, Kings, and Kern Counties. The new rules are the first regulations requiring farmers in California to monitor and protect groundwater, although surface water has been regulated on an interim basis since 2003.
The new program is the latest development in the Water Board’s Irrigated Lands Regulatory Monitoring Program (ILRMP), established in 2003. The new rules will impact approximately 7,200 growers comprising about 850,000 acres of farmland within the Tulare Lake Basin area.
Under the new regulations, each farm must conduct an evaluation to assess groundwater quality and the effectiveness of existing water management practices. Based on these assessments, existing farmer-run coalitions will handle monitoring of ground and surface water, reporting results to the Water Board on behalf of coalition members. Farms deemed at high risk for ongoing water quality issues will be required to conduct additional monitoring and devise management plans to remedy contamination.
While farmers have repeatedly expressed concerns about the financial burden the regulations will place upon farmers, the Water Board estimates the cost to implement the new rules will be less than $2 per acre.
Ground water in the San Joaquin Valley has historically been contaminated with nitrates from fertilizers, septic systems, sewage treatment and decaying plants. In a 2012 study, University of California at Davis researchers concluded that 96% of the contamination in the Valley resulted from application of nitrates to croplands.
--Kathryn Oehlschlager
For more information, contact Kathryn Oehlschlager at (415) 228-5458, klo@bcltlaw.com.
The new program is the latest development in the Water Board’s Irrigated Lands Regulatory Monitoring Program (ILRMP), established in 2003. The new rules will impact approximately 7,200 growers comprising about 850,000 acres of farmland within the Tulare Lake Basin area.
Under the new regulations, each farm must conduct an evaluation to assess groundwater quality and the effectiveness of existing water management practices. Based on these assessments, existing farmer-run coalitions will handle monitoring of ground and surface water, reporting results to the Water Board on behalf of coalition members. Farms deemed at high risk for ongoing water quality issues will be required to conduct additional monitoring and devise management plans to remedy contamination.
While farmers have repeatedly expressed concerns about the financial burden the regulations will place upon farmers, the Water Board estimates the cost to implement the new rules will be less than $2 per acre.
Ground water in the San Joaquin Valley has historically been contaminated with nitrates from fertilizers, septic systems, sewage treatment and decaying plants. In a 2012 study, University of California at Davis researchers concluded that 96% of the contamination in the Valley resulted from application of nitrates to croplands.
--Kathryn Oehlschlager
For more information, contact Kathryn Oehlschlager at (415) 228-5458, klo@bcltlaw.com.
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